Successive Tortfeasors: Settlement Does Not Bar Indemnity Action for Damages from Subsequent Negligence by Sowards, Rita Carper
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 48 
Issue 1 Winter 1983 Article 17 
Winter 1983 
Successive Tortfeasors: Settlement Does Not Bar Indemnity 
Action for Damages from Subsequent Negligence 
Rita Carper Sowards 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rita Carper Sowards, Successive Tortfeasors: Settlement Does Not Bar Indemnity Action for Damages 
from Subsequent Negligence, 48 MO. L. REV. (1983) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/17 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
SUCCESSIVE TORTFEASORS:




State ex rel Tarrasch v. Crow'
In a ground-breaking decision, the Missouri Supreme Court clarified
the right of an initial tortfeasor to seek indemnity for any increased dam-
ages caused by subsequent negligence and held that this indemnity right
may not be cut off by a settlement between the successive tortfeasor and the
plaintiff. The decision, another in the string of cases following in the wake
of Missouri Paczi, Railroad v. Whitehead & Kales Co. ,2 may also be authority
by analogy for the proposition that a joint or concurrent tortfeasor's settle-
ment with the plaintiff may not relieve him of the duty of contribution to
his nonsettling co-tortfeasor.
The plaintiff in State ex rel Tarrasch v. Crow3 filed suit against a school
bus driver, a fellow student, and an opthamologist. The plaintiff alleged
that the driver negligently left his bus unattended after a mechanical fail-
ure; during the driver's absence, the fellow student threw a ruler, striking
the plaintiff in the eye. Negligent medical treatment by the doctor aggra-
vated the injury and resulted in the plaintiff's total blindness. The plaintiff
sought damages from the driver and the student for the initial injury and
for his loss of vision4 and from the doctor for his loss of vision.' The driver
1. 622 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. En Banc 1981).
2. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. En Banc 1978). The Missouri Supreme Court held in
Whitehead &Kales that contribution actions may be brought against joint or con-
current tortfeasors and that damages may be apportioned among them on the basis
of relative fault. Id. at 474. Missouri had previously followed the common law rule
that joint or concurrent tortfeasors were not entitled to contribution if they were
equally culpable. Id. at 469. Due to the harshness of this rule, a number of excep-
tions were devised, including an active-passive distinction based on the equitable
concept of implied indemnity. See notes 20-27 and accompanying text infra. For an
analysis of the use of implied indemnity, see Comment, Products Liability--Non-Con-
tractualndemniy--The Ect of the Active-Passive Negligence Theogy in Misouri, 41 Mo.
L. REv. 382 (1976); Comment, Procedure-ThirdParty Practice-Non-Contractual Indem-
niflation, 28 Mo. L. REv. 307 (1963).
3. 622 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. En Banc 1981).
4. Id. at 930. If the plaintiff's allegations were true, the driver and the student
were concurrent tortfeasors. Their wholly independent acts combined to produce an
indivisible injury, i.e., the initial injury to the plaintiff's eye. Joint tortfeasors, in
contrast, act in concert to produce an indivisible injury. Both joint and concurrent
1
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and the student filed cross-claims6 against the doctor, seeking a determina-
tion of relative fault and apportionment of damages.
7
Before trial, the plaintiff settled with the driver and the doctor," exe-
cuting covenants not to sue either defendant 9 and releasing both from all
claims and actions related to the initial suit. The driver then dismissed his
cross-claim against the doctor. All that remained of the action was the
plaintiff's claim against the fellow student and the student's cross-claim for
indemnity against the doctor." The doctor moved for summary judgment
on the cross-claim, asserting that his settlement with the plaintiff barred
further action against him.'1 When the trial judge indicated an intent to
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the entire harm. W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 46-48 (4th ed. 1971). See also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead &
Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Mo. En Banc 1978) (no real difference between
joint 4nd concurrent tortfeasors today; principle of fairness applies to both); Ste-
phenson v. McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 211 n.5 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (term "joint
tortfeasors" includes concurrent tortfeasors for purposes of non-contractual indem-
nification or contribution). See general.y Note, The Mag Carter Agreement--Solving the
Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1393-94
(1974).
5. 622 S.W.2d at 930. The doctor could not be held liable for the original
injury because his acts did not cause it. State ex rel. Baldwin v. Gaertner, 613
S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Mo. En Banc 1981). The plaintiff asserted that the doctor's
negligent failure to remove the injured eye resulted in sympathetic opthalmia and
total blindness in the plaintiff's other eye. 622 S.W.2d at 930.
6. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 509.460-.470 (1978) (cross-claims and impleader
actions). Both types of action are available to joint, concurrent, and successive
tortfeasors because both of the criteria are met: (1) the claims arise out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject of the main action; and (2) the claims are
asserted against a party who is or may be liable for all or part of the claim. 622
S.W.2d at 934-35. See aso Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566
S.W.2d 466, 468 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
7. 622 S.W.2d at 930.
8. Both the driver and the doctor paid their maximum insurance policy limits.
Id.
9. Covenants not to sue are used instead of releases to avoid the common law
rule that a plaintiff's release of one tortfeasor discharges all tortfeasors liable for the
same injury. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 49. For analysis of the common law rule
and its demise in Missouri, see Settling Joint Torleasor Can Sue for Contribution -from
NonsettlingJoint Tortfoeasor, 46 Mo. L. REv. 886, 887-89 (1981).
10. The student's cross-claim actually sought determination of respective rela-
tive fault and apportionment of damages among the defendants. 622 S.W.2d at
930. The cross-claim was couched in terms of contribution in the form of relative
fault because the student believed the action was authorized by Whitehead &Xales.
Contribution entitles a defendant to partial relief from a co-tortfeasor, while indem-
nity entitles him to complete relief. Comment, Contribution in Missouri -Procedure and
Defenses Under the New Rule, 44 Mo. L. REV. 691, 692-94 (1979); Comment, 41 Mo.
L. REV., supra note 2, at 382-84.
11. 622 S.W.2d at 934. The doctor relied on cases holding that a joint or con-
19831
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deny his motion, 2 the doctor petitioned the Missouri Supreme Court for a
writ of prohibition. 3 That court denied the writ, thus settling an impor-
tant issue in Missouri tort law. It is now clear that the right of an initial
tortfeasor to seek total indemnity from a successive tortfeasor cannot be
prejudiced by a settlement to which he was not a party. 4
current tortfeasor's settlement bars all actions against him, including those for con-
tribution. See generally Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970); Norton v.
Benjamin, 222 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966); Kuna v. Hollman, 137 N.J. Super. 199, 238
A.2d 550 (1975); McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 136 S.E.2d 218 (1964); Blanchard
v. Wilt, 410 Pa. 356, 188 A.2d 722 (1963); Claunch v. Bennett, 395 S.W.2d 719
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965). For good collections of authorities, see Comment, supra note
10, at 714-19; Annot., 12 U.L.A. 57, 104-06 nn., 7 & 8 (1975); Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d
1374, 1374-86 (1970).
12. The trial judge evidenced his intent in a memorandum stating his belief
that a settling tortfeasor cannot cut off the right of another tortfeasor to receive
contribution for the settling party's proportionate share of liability to an injured
party. 622 S.W.2d at 930.
13. Id.
14. The initial tortfeasor's indemnity action may be barred by a settlement if
he is in privity or other legal relationship with a party to the settlement. 622
S.W.2d at 935. One judge dissented in Tarrasch, arguing that the doctor's settle-
ment with the plaintiff barred the student's indemnity claim because the right to
indemnity is a derivative right that is defeated when the plaintiff no longer has a
cause of action against the initial tortfeasor. When the plaintiff settled with the
successive tortfeasor, both the claim against the initial tortfeasor (for injuries caused
by the successive tortfeasor) and the derivative indemnity action were extinguished.
Id. at 938 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). Cf. Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d
188, 204 (Mo. En Banc 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (settlement should bar con-
tribution action against settling tortfeasor). The dissent's argument, it should be
noted, treated the plaintiff's covenant with the doctor as a general release that
barred all claims against any tortfeasor responsible for the plaintiff's subsequent
injury. 622 S.W.2d at 938 (Rendlen, J., dissenting). Covenants not to sue, however,
may be treated as partial rather than general releases. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060
(1978). The wording of the covenant at issue expressly reserved all claims against
the driver and the student, 622 S.W.2d at 936, and thus fulfilled the requirements
for a partial release. See Western Newspaper Union v. Woodward, 133 F. Supp. 17,
23 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (release does not discharge joint tortfeasors unless it is in full
satisfaction of all claims); State ex rel. Normandy Orthopedics, Inc. v. Crandall, 581
S.W.2d 829, 833-34 (Mo. En Banc 1979) (whether release is general or partial is
question of fact). But see Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886, 890-91
(Mo. App., K.C. 1974) (release that says "all claims" and indicates that it is in full
satisfaction for injuries will be considered general and will bar all further claims).
For a look at how other courts handle releases under these circumstances, see Weck-
er v. Kilmer, 260 Ind. 198, 203, 294 N.E.2d 132, 135 (1973) (question of fact
whether release of initial tortfeasor bars suit against successive tortfeasor); Fieser v.
St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 212 Kan. 35, 42, 410 P.2d 145, 151 (1973)
(release of initial tortfeasor is affirmative defense to be pleaded by successive
tortfeasor); Kyte v. McMillion, 256 Md. 85, 98, 259 A.2d 532, 539 (1969) (release of
[Vol. 48
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In reaching this decision, the court rejected the argument that an ini-
tial tortfeasor has no right to indemnity or contribution from a successive
tortfeasor. 5 The doctor in Tarrasch had maintained that the remedy of pre-
judgment apportionment of fault and contribution established in Whitehead
& Kales is available only to joint and concurrent tortfeasors, not a succes-
sive tortfeasor like himself. 6 The court agreed that the cross-claim against
the doctor was not the sort of partial indemnity or contribution claim rec-
ognized in Whitehead & Kales17 but found an independent right to total
indemnity antedating that case."'
Tarrasch is the first Missouri case to expressly hold that an initial
tortfeasor has a right to total indemnity from a successive tortfeasor. Al-
though the court did not identify the source of this right, it relied on Gertz v.
Campbell,' 9 a similar case in which the Illinois Supreme Court recognized a
right to indemnity based on equitable principles.20 Missouri courts have
successive tortfeasor does not bar suit for original injuries against initial tortfeasor);
Huff v. Harbaugh, 49 Md. App. 661,670-71,435 A.2d 108, 113-14 (1981) (release of
one party in successive tortfeasor case does not bar suit against the other); Selby v.
Kuhns, 345 Mass. 600, 608, 188 N.E.2d 861, 866 (1963) (plaintiff who settles with
initial tortfeasor has burden of proof regarding full satisfaction); Lasprogata v.
Quails, 263 Pa. Super. 174, 179, 397 A.2d 803, 807 (1979) (release of successive
tortfeasor does not bar suit against initial tortfeasor); McMillan v. Klingensmith,
467 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. 1971) (settlement does not bar action against nonsettling
successive tortfeasor); Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 586 (Wyo. 1979) (question of
fact whether initial tortfeasor's release bars action against successive tortfeasor).
15. 622 S.W.2d at 934.
16. Brief for Relator at 8-9, Tarrasch. The doctor's argument was based on the
refusal of Missouri courts, in some cases, to allow contribution actions among par-
ties who were not joint or concurrent tortfeasors. In these cases, however, either
parties were not commonly liable to the plaintiff, see, e.g., State ex rel. Maryland
Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Mo. En
Banc 1979) (employer not subject to action for contribution when statute granted
immunity), or a legal bar to the claim existed, see, e.g., Renfrow v. Gojohn, 600
S.W.2d 77, 79 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (interspousal immunity); Martinez v. Lank-
ster, 595 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (same). Cf. Kohler v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 600 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (no bar to contribution
action against plaintiff's family member).
17. For analysis of the implications of Whitehead & Kales, see generally Com-
ment, supra note 10; Tort Law: Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead & Kales Co.:
Uncertain Renovations, 48 UMKC L. REv. 54 (1979).
18. 622 S.W.2d at 934.
19. 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
20. Id. at 91-92, 302 N.E.2d at 44-45. The plaintiff in Gertz sued an automobile
driver to recover for initial injuries and for their aggravation by subsequent medical
malpractice. The driver, in turn, sought indemnity by impleading the negligent
doctor. Id. at 85-86, 302 N.E.2d at 41-42. The Gertz court pointed out that prohib-
iting an indemnity action by an initial tortfeasor, whose liability is increased only
by the independent subsequent tortfeasor over whom he has no control, would re-
1983]
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long held that equity requires a wrongdoer to reimburse another person
compelled to pay damages on account of the wrongdoer's act.2" Since the
sole cause of an initial tortfeasor's added liability2 2 is the successive
tortfeasor's negligence, the right recognized in Tarrasch may well be rooted
in this venerable concept of equitable or implied indemnity. Either of two
specific implied indemnity theories would support the holding in Tarrasch.
First, the right to indemnity may have been implied from the breach of a
respective duty to a co-tortfeasor. A successive tortfeasor breaches a duty to
an initial tortfeasor by increasing the damages chargeable to him.23 Sec-
suit in the indefensible enrichment of the successive tortfeasor at the initial
tortfeasor's expense. Id. at 91-92, 302 N.E.2d at 44-45. The Tarrash court agreed
with this analysis, stating that "as against the. . . [successive tortfeasor], the initial
tortfeasor is not justly chargeable with the damages from the aggravation and is
entitled to indemnity." 622 S.W.2d at 932. See also Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 69, 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493-94 (1964) (implied indemnity available to
initial tortfeasor for subsequent negligence); Lindsey v. Austin, 336 So. 2d 486, 487
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (complaint seeking indemnity as passive tortfeasor for
subsequent negligence states cause of action). Seegeneraly RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 457 (1965); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639 (1966).
21. Equitable or implied rights of indemnity have been recognized in a number
of situations. See, e.g., Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 361 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo.
1962) (suppliers and manufacturers must indemnify third person or retailer who
was unaware of defect at time of sale); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills,
Inc., 338 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Mo. 1960) (active tortfeasor creating dangerous situation
must indemnify passive tortfeasor who caused injury); Barb v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
281 S.W.2d 297, 304 (Mo. 1955) (owner of property may seek indemnity from
tortfeasor who created dangerous situation on property); State ex rel. Algiere v. Rus-
sell, 359 Mo. 800, 803, 223 S.W.2d 481,483 (En Banc 1949) (principal may recover
indemnity from negligent agent); City of Springfield v. Clement, 205 Mo. App. 114,
120-21, 225 S.W. 120, 122-23 (Spr. 1920) (city may seek indemnity from negligent
abutting property owner). See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76
(1937); Comment, 41 Mo. L. REV., supra note 2; Comment, 28 Mo. L. REV., supra
note 2.
22. Missouri has expressly adopted the common law rule that an initial
tortfeasor is liable for the original injury and for any foreseeable harm caused by
subsequent negligence. See Staehlin v. Hochdoerfer, 235 S.W. 1060, 1062 (Mo.
1921) (announcing rule). See also Boehmer v. Boggiano, 412 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Mo.
1967) (initial tortfeasor liable for aggravation by subsequent negligence); Schu-
macher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 1245-46, 232 S.W.2d 913, 914 (En Banc 1950)
(liable for subsequent negligence that was probable and natural consequence of
original wrong). An initial tortfeasor arguably would be entitled to an implied in-
demnity action because he is required to pay damages on account of the successive
tortfeasor's negligence.
23. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 184-85, 222 S.W.2d
995, 1002 (1949). Cf. State ex rel. Siegel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1958) (indemnitee must prove that he breached no duty to indemnitor
and that indemnitor breached duty toward him). For an analysis of this theory, see
Comment, 28 Mo. L. REV. supra note 2, at 309-10.
[Vol. 48
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ond, the right may have been based on the old active-passive distinction.
24
Prior to Whitehead &Kales, one active tortfeasor had no right to indemnity
from another active tortfeasor for damages paid on account of mutual
fault,2 5 but a passive tortfeasor was entitled to indemnity from an active
tortfeasor for such damages.26 The active-passive distinction resulted in all-
or-nothing judgments, and it was rejected by Whitehead &Kales in favor of a
relative fault test.27 But if, as the court indicates, Whitehead &Kales has no
application to cases involving successive tortfeasors, the active-passive dis-
tinction may still be significant in such cases. Under pre-Whitehead &Kales
principles, a suit for indemnity by the initial tortfeasor (e.g., the student)-
whose negligence was passive with respect to the aggravation of the plain-
tiff's injury-against the active successive tortfeasor (e.g., the doctor) might
well have been entertained.
After rejecting the doctor's first argument, the court considered his sec-
ond: even if a right to indemnity generally existed, it should not be applied
against a successive tortfeasor who has settled with a plaintiff. The doctor
pointed out that permitting an indemnity action could result in liability for
the settling tortfeasor in excess of his settlement amount.28 Compromise, he
argued, is a favorite of the law,2 9 and any decision that strips settlements of
finality and robs defendants of protection from further liability would so
discourage settlements as to contravene public policy.
30
24. For analysis of the active-passive theory, see generally Comment, 41 Mo. L.
REV., supra note 2; Comment, 28 Mo. L. REV., supra note 2; Civil Procedure-The
Active-Passive Negligence Theogy, 30 Mo. L. REV. 624 (1965).
25. Comment, 41 Mo. L. REV., supra note 2, at 382-83; Note, TheJoint Torifeasor
in Missouri, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 572, 572-73 (1940).
26. See, e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 338 S.W.2d 1, 5-6
(Mo. 1960). It was often difficult to distinguish active from passive negligence.
Comment, 28 Mo. L. REV., supra note 2, at 310. Although Whitehead &Kales aban-
doned the active-passive distinction in joint and concurrent tortfeasor cases in favor
of a relative fault test, 566 S.W.2d at 472-74, the decision does not apply to succes-
sive tortfeasor cases and any pre-existing remedy remained intact. Tarrasch, 622
S.W.2d at 933-34.
27. 566 S.W.2d at 474.
28. 622 S.W.2d at 934. For example, a successive tortfeasor who settles with
the plaintiff for $50,000 might later be required to pay the cost of defending in
indemnity action in which he is adjudged liable for another $450,000. A prospect of
such further liability, argued the doctor in Tarrasch, removes all incentive for the
defendant to settle. While recognizing the possibility of such a result, the Missouri
Supreme Court pointed out that it could be avoided by carefully drafting the settle-
ment agreement. Id. at 936. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
29. 622 S.W.2d at 934. See, e.g., Sosa v. Velvet Dairy Stores, Inc., 407 S.W.2d
615, 622 (Mo. App., K.C. 1966).
30. For analysis of the import of a settlement's finality and protection, see
Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 480-81 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (release
protects settling tortfeasor from liability with regard to all of plaintiff's injuries,
even if settlement was not full satisfaction); Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 512
1983]
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This argument was flatly rejected by the court.3 ' Barring an initial
tortfeasor's right to indemnity under the circumstances of Tarrasch, said the
court, would be "a gross violation of due process."'32 A successive tortfeasor
commits two wrongs--one against the plaintiff (by aggravating his original
injuries) and one against the initial tortfeasor (by increasing his liability).
Settling with the plaintiff discharges the successive tortfqasor's duty to the
plaintiff, but the injury to the initial tortfeasor remains, unredressed unless
the settlement constitutes full compensation for the plaintiff's subsequent
injuries. 33 Permitting a settlement of one cause of action to deprive a non-
party of his separate cause of action would violate due process. 34
The court also disputed the doctor's contention that allowing indem-
nity actions against settling tortfeasors would discourage settlements, noting
S.W.2d 886, 890 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974) (once plaintiff settles with tortfeasor, cause
of action against tortfeasor is extinguished and cannot be revived); State ex rel. State
Highway Comm'n v. Sheets, 483 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Mo. App., St. L. 1972) (purpose
of settlement is to obtain peace).
31. '622 S.W.2d at 934. The court agreed that the decision may have an impact
on settlements but concluded that preserving the initial tortfeasor's rights is more
important. Id. at 935.
32. Id. Individual freedom from deprivation of property without due process is
protected in U.S. CONsT. amends. V, VII; Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 10. See Dewitt v.
Lutes, 581 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979) (due process applies to protect
person's cause of action, but no violation if person was party to settlement that bars
cause of action). A cause of action is usually considered property. Ludlow-Saylor
Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 343, 205 S.W. 196, 198 (En Banc 1918).
Notice and opportunity to be heard are the essentials of due process. Dittmeier v.
Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 316 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. En Banc 1958). Thus, denial
of a cause of action without notice and opportunity to be heard is a deprivation of
property without due process. Tarrasch, 622 S.W.2d at 935.
It can also be argued that allowing a settlement to bar an indemnity action is a
denial of the right of access to the courts, which is protected by Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 14. That section provides that the courts shall offer a remedy for every injury to
person, property, or character. See Homer v. David Distrib. Co., 599 S.W.2d 100,
102 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (purpose of section is to protect citizens in enforcing
rights recognized by law). But see Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Henningsen Steel
Prods. Co., 612 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1980) (employer immunity from tort liability
to third party did not violate Missouri's right of access to courts); Renfrow v.
Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (spousal immunity did not vio-
late right of access, which protects only rights recognized by law).
33. Suppose, for example, that the jury awarded the plaintiff a $1,000,000
judgment against the student and apportioned the doctor's liability at 50% on the
student's cross-claim. The student was actually responsible for $500,000 of the
plaintiff's damage, but he would be required to pay the entire judgment, less the
$50,000 paid by the doctor. The $50,000 must be deducted because the plaintiff is
entitled to receive only one "full satisfaction" for his injuries. Liberty v. J.A. Tobin
Constr. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974). The doctor in this situa-
tion wronged the student in the amount of $450,000.
34. 622 S.W.2d at 935.
[Vol. 48
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that settling tortfeasors can protect themselves from further liability with
carefully drafted settlement agreements.3 5 The agreement between the doc-
tor and the plaintiff was praised by the court as an example of good drafts-
manship. In exchange for $50,000, the plaintiff promised to dismiss all
claims against the doctor and refrain from further prosecution.3 6 The
plaintiff promised that if cross-claims were permitted by the driver or the
student against the doctor, the plaintiff would consider the doctor's pay-
ment full satisfaction of any additional liability attributed to the doctor's
negligence.3 7 To ensure that the doctor was protected from further liabil-
ity, the plaintiff assigned to him that portion of any judgment he received
against the driver or the student that was, contemporaneously or later, at-
tributed- to the doctor's negligence.3 ' The plaintiff also agreed to ask the
court to offset the driver's or the student's judgment by any amount attrib-
uted to the doctor's fault.
3 9
Although consistent with the modern trend, Tarrasch is at odds with a
number ofjurisdictions that bar all further action against joint, concurrent,
and, presumably, successive tortfeasors. These jurisdictions emphasize the
policy favoring settlements and hold that a settling tortfeasor is entitled to
the finality and protection of his settlement against all actions, including
those for indemnity, apportionment, and contribution.4 ° A settling
tortfeasor, according to these courts, intends to make payment without in-
volving himself in costly judicial proceedings, and allowing contribution ac-
35. Id. at 936.
36. The plaintiff expressly reserved all claims against the driver and the student
in his settlement agreement. Id.
37. If the agreement and covenant not to sue did not in fact bar further claims
against the doctor, the plaintiff agreed to hold him harmless to the extent that he
had to pay more than $50,000. The plaintiff also agreed that the $50,000 would
satisfy any obligation for damages against the doctor based on his relative fault and
that no judgment based on relative fault would be payable by the doctor. Id.
38. The agreement and corresponding examples actually named the driver
rather than the student and were written as though the judgment would be for
relative fault rather than indemnity for subsequent negligence. See id.
39. The agreement included two examples. Assuming, for example, that the
plaintiff recovered a $1,000,000 judgment against the student, and the jury deter-
mined on the cross-claim that the doctor was responsible for 50% of the damages,
the student would be responsible to the plaintiff for $950,000 ($1,000,000 minus the
$50,000 paid by the doctor). The student would be entitled to $450,000 in indemni-
fication from the doctor. The judgment due the plaintiff would be satisfied when
the student paid the $500,000 for his own negligence. The indemnity owed the
student would be satisfied by the court's reduction of the damage award in accord-
ance with the settlement agreement. Id.
40. See, e.g., Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 251 (Me. 1966); McNair v.
Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 5, 136 S.E.2d 218, 220-21 (1964); Claunch v. Bennett, 395
S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). This is the approach advocated in UNI-
FORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4 (1955), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
1983]
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/17
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tions against him will result in the very expenditures of time and money
that he hoped to avoid.
Other jurisdictions allow actions against settling joint and concurrent
tortfeasors without distinguishing them from successive tortfeasors.4" In
some of these jurisdictions, the nonsettling tortfeasor may implead the set-
tling tortfeasor for a determination of relative fault. The court will reduce
the nonsettling tortfeasor's damages accordingly and will require no addi-
tional payment by the settling tortfeasor.42
Tarrasch recognizes the right of an initial tortfeasor to obtain indemnity
from a successive tortfeasor.4 3 The court's holding that one tortfeasor's set-
tlement cannot bar another tortfeasor's indemnity claim4 4 may be applica-
ble to joint and concurrent tortfeasors as well as successive tortfeasors.45
41. See, e.g., Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970); Kuna v. Hollman,
137 N.J. Super. 199, 207, 348 A.2d 550, 554 (1975); Blanchard v. Wilt, 410 Pa. 356,
361, 188 A.2d 722, 725 (1963).
42. See, e.g., Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 1968); Orr v. Cole-
man, 455 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Ky. 1970); Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey,
81 N.J. 548, 570, 410 A.2d 674, 685 (1980); Tarantola v. Williams, 48 A.D.2d 552,
560, 371 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139-40 (1975); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113,
121-22 (N.D. 1979). This is the approach advocated in COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
§ 6 (1979), 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1983).
43. The court did not examine the rights of the other tortfeasors in Tarrasch.
The driver may be in a particularly favorable position. Under Stephenson v. Mc-
Clure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980), he may be entitled, as a settling
concurrent tortfeasor, to contribution from the student for a portion of the $100,000
he paid in settlement to the plaintiff. He may also have indemnity rights against
the doctor, whose subsequent negligence added to the damages chargeable both to
him and the student, although any action against the doctor may be defeated by
the driver's dismissal with prejudice of his own cross-claim. Tarrasch, 622 S.W.2d at
930. The doctor's position is less favorable. He would not be entitled to indemnity
or contribution from the driver or the student for the subsequent injury because his
acts were the sole cause of the subsequent injury. See State ex rel. Baldwin v.
Gaertner, 613 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Mo. En Banc 1981). He would not be entitled
to recover from the driver or the student if he paid a settlement in excess of the
judgment against him because (1) he chose that amount, (2) the driver and the
student were not responsible to the doctor, for the subsequent negligence, and
(3) the settlement was not recompense for the original injuries, for which he had no
liability. See Tarrasch, 622 S.W.2d at 937 (gain or loss is nature of settlements). The
student may possibly have partial indemnity-contribution-rights against the
driver if the courts hold that settlements do not bar such claims in Missouri. See
notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra.
44. 622 S.W.2d at 936. The Missouri Supreme Court characterized the initial
tortfeasor as, in effect, a third part beneficiary of the settlement agreement.
45. Division of the injury among tortfeasors on the basis of fault places the
nonsettling joint or concurrent tortfeasor in the same position as a nonsettling ini-
tial tortfeasor. Ajoint or concurrent tortfeasor, like a successive tortfeasor, commits
two wrongs: one against the plaintiff by causing his injuries and one against his co-
[Vol. 48
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The arguments for precluding contribution actions are the same in both
cases and can be countered by much the same reasoning.4 6 In both cases,
barring the nonsettling tortfeasor's contribution or indemnity action cuts off
his claim for compensation from the settling tortfeasor without notice or an
opportunity to be heard. If due process precludes one, it should preclude
the other.4 7 The case also contains a grave warning for Missouri practition-
ers: a settlement agreement that does not provide for contribution or in-
demnity actions may expose the settling tortfeasor to liability greatly in
excess of the settlement amount.
RITA CARPER SOWARDS
tortfeasor by increasing the latter's liability. Settling with the plaintiff discharges
the duty to the plaintiff, but it does not discharge the duty to the co-tortfeasor
unless the settlement is in full compensation for that portion of the injuries attrib-
uted to the settling tortfeasor.
46. Suppose, for example, a $1,000,000 judgment was returned against the
nonsettling tortfeasor and a jury determined that the tortfeasor who had settled for
$100,000 was responsible for 60% ($600,000) of the judgment. If the settlement
barred the contribution action, the nonsettling tortfeasor would be liable for
$900,000 ($1,000,000 minus the $100,000 paid by the settling tortfeasor), $500,000
of which was due to the negligence of the settling tortfeasor. The settling tortfeasor
would have wronged the nonsettling tortfeasor by $600,000 (the amount by which
his negligence increased the latter's liability), and the nonsettling tortfeasor would
have received only the $100,000 reduction in the judgment.
47. There is no reason to believe that joint and concurrent tortfeasors could
not, as easily as successive tortfeasors, limit their liability by carefully drawn agree-
ments. The settlement document in Tarrasch, in fact, was drafted as though a rela-
tive fault judgment would occur. 622 S.W.2d at 936.
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